This paper considers a class of N-person discretetime dynamic games with an asymmetric information structure. Each player has private information revealed only to himself, which is modeled as a random variable called the type. Each player aims to find an optimal feedback control policy to reach the desired state while minimizing the control cost without exact knowledge of the system dynamics. Players can form a belief on the unknowns based on the observation of the state trajectory and update it via the Bayesian rule to learn the type value of other players. To deal with the uncertainty caused by the private information, each player forms his control policy under the expectation of the type belief, which forms the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). The strong coupling of the type estimation and the control policy establishes no separation principle in our non-classical information structure. In particular, we investigate the linear-quadratic setting, and we obtain generalized Riccati equations and an affine statefeedback PBNE policy. Moreover, we show that the PBNE policy is unique if it exists and is strongly time consistent. Finally, we numerically illustrate the proposed framework with a case study.
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Abstract-This paper considers a class of N-person discretetime dynamic games with an asymmetric information structure. Each player has private information revealed only to himself, which is modeled as a random variable called the type. Each player aims to find an optimal feedback control policy to reach the desired state while minimizing the control cost without exact knowledge of the system dynamics. Players can form a belief on the unknowns based on the observation of the state trajectory and update it via the Bayesian rule to learn the type value of other players. To deal with the uncertainty caused by the private information, each player forms his control policy under the expectation of the type belief, which forms the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). The strong coupling of the type estimation and the control policy establishes no separation principle in our non-classical information structure. In particular, we investigate the linear-quadratic setting, and we obtain generalized Riccati equations and an affine statefeedback PBNE policy. Moreover, we show that the PBNE policy is unique if it exists and is strongly time consistent. Finally, we numerically illustrate the proposed framework with a case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic game theory models the long-term interactions of multiple strategic decision makers. It has a broad application in security and privacy of cyber-physical systems [1] , industrial and environmental economics [2] , the protection of large-scale interdependent infrastructures [3] , and the collective opinion formulation of multiagent systems [4] . In many practical applications such as the auctions design [5] and cyber deception [6] , each player has his own private information unknown to the other players which creates information asymmetry among the players. In the auction, the bidder has a private evaluation of the good regardless of his bid. In the cyber deception games, the defender may not know whether the current user is legitimate or not due to the stealthy and the deceptive feature of the attacks [7] .
In this work, we consider an N-player dynamic game with the shared state dynamics described by a linear state-space model driven by a sequence of additive noise with a known distribution. Each player has his private information that can influence the state dynamics and thus the cost functions of all the players.
Following the Harsanyi's approach [8] , we use a random variable, known as the private type or the attribute of the player, to model the piece of information that one player knows but the other players do not. The distribution of the 1 type is commonly known but its realization is only known to the player himself. The information structure of each player's feedback control policy consists of the private knowledge of his own type and the observation of the common state variable. This kind of information structure is non-classical [9] where one player's control action will affect the state transition, thus the information structure of other players at the next stage. The existence of the additive noise sequence makes it impossible for the other players to infer the exact value of that player's control, and further his private type. Similar to the Witsenhausen's counterexample where the information of the second controller depends on the decisions of the first controller, and all the variations [10] on the non-classical information structure, the multi-agent control problem in our work also couples with the estimation of the private types.
This formulationà la Harsanyi with a 'hidden type' leads to a class of dynamic Bayesian games of asymmetric information and is applicable to cooperative scenarios, such as a distributed control of multi-agent systems with a limited information sharing due to communication constraints or privacy issues, uncooperative scenarios, such as each player aims to track a different reference signal, and competitive scenarios, such as in the pursuit and evasion games where the pursuers do not know the exact system dynamics of the evaders and vice versa.
However, there lacks methods to solve this class of dynamic game where the hidden types or private information in lieu of the imperfect monitoring of the state introduce the incomplete information. In addition, there are two kinds of uncertainties in the system, i.e., the external system noise and the internal 'type' uncertainties. The additive system noise hides player's type, making it harder for the players to map out the types of the other players and the associated system dynamics. On the other hand, as the private information of the players jointly affects their payoff and the state dynamics, each strategic player learns the true type through state observations and determine the control. To this end, we set up a Bayesian learning framework where each player forms a belief in the others' type and updates his belief according to the arriving observation at each stage.
Each player aims to optimize his own expected cost and leads to the solution concept of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) where no players can benefit from unilateral deviation at each stage. We use dynamic programming to compute the PBNE backwardly and obtain generalized Riccati equations coupled linearly with the belief dynamics. Once exists, the PBNE control policy is unique and takes the form of an affine state-feedback control. Moreover, the PBNE policy is subgame perfect, thus robust to mistakes and uncertainties at each stage. We characterize the structure of the equilibrium policy and the necessary conditions for the existence of solutions.
From the case study, we show that the belief dynamics converges to the true types. The convergence rate depends on the system parameters under different types. The results on the PBNE control and the state tracking show that the players can track a sinusoidal signal under the PBNE. We observe that a more capable player spends more control efforts and a higher cost in the distributed cooperation with local private information.
The system model considered in this work has a connection with Markov jump systems under incomplete information of the mode [11] , in which the system switches among different operation modes and the controller cannot observe the mode directly. The coupling of the estimation and the control in our framework also aligned well with a class of bandit-arm type of problems where there exists a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation [12] .
A. Notations
Throughout the paper, we use calligraphic letter X to define the set, Pr for probability, E for expectation, and Tr for the trace of the matrix. Denote I as the identity matrix of a proper dimension and the matrix transpose as ′ . The superscript k is the stage index and the subscript i is the player index. There are N players and K stages where player P i has N i possible type realizations. The control policy µ k i and the belief l k i are mappings while the control value u k i and the belief statel k i are the outcome of the mapping.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the state dynamics and the Bayesian belief update. The analysis of the linear quadratic setting is introduced in Section III to obtain the PBNE policy as well as the generalized Riccati equations. In Section IV, a case study of a scalar system is presented and Section V concludes the paper.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed dynamic game consists a set N := {1, 2, · · · , N} of N players. To model the private information, we introduce a discrete random variableθ i as the type of each player P i , i ∈ N . The type value θ i is the realization of the random variableθ i and is private information of P i . Thus, each player P l does not know other players' type
Each player P i has an initial belief of the others' type, i.e., the prior distributionl 0 i ofθ −i is commonly known.
A. Stochastic State Dynamics
We consider the following state dynamics in (1) with an n−dimensional system state x k ∈ X ⊆ R n at stage k ∈ K := {0, 1, · · · , K} and m i -dimensional control inputs u k i ∈ U i ⊆ R m i for each player i.
The joint type θ := {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ N } ∈ ∏ N i=1 Θ i of all players and the additive noise sequence w k ∈ R n (not necessarily Gaussian) affect the system dynamics. For simplicity, we assume the noise sequence to be independent E(w j (w i ) ′ ) = 0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ K , with a zeros mean E(w k ) = 0 and a covariance matrix E(w k (w k ) ′ ) = Q k , ∀k ∈ K . At each stage k, the information available to player P i consists the full state history h k := {x 0 , · · · , x k } as well as his own type value θ i . Thus, the control value u k i should be a outcome of the control policy µ k i (h k , θ i ) under the given information structure {h k , θ i }. As we will later show in Theorem 1, with the Markov belief update in (2), the control policyμ k i (x k , θ i ) is Markov with respect to the state.
B. Forward Belief Update
Each player i at time k forms a Markov belief l k i :
Then the new arrival of state observations x k+1 leads to the following Bayesian update:
.
Because of Pr(x k+1 |θ −i , h k , θ i ) = Pr(x k+1 |θ −i , x k , θ i ) and the Markov assumption of the belief, i.e., Pr(θ −i |h k , θ i ) = Pr(θ −i |x k , θ i ), P i can update his belief of others' types via
With a known probability density function d w k of the noise w k , Pr(
is the PBNE policy of player i in Definition 1. Note that player i can compute the equilibrium policy µ * ,k i , ∀i ∈ N , yet cannot observe the control value u k −i of other players directly. Define the outcome of the belief mapping l k i as l k i ∈ △Θ −i . We embed the belief in the optimization problem as a state by taking expectation of the random variableθ −i with respect tol k i .
C. Nonzero-Sum Cost and PBNE
At stage k, player i's cost function is g k i :
be the expected cost-togo function of player i from stage k 0 to the terminal stage K. Each player P i aims to determine his control value u k i at each stage k = k 0 , k 0 + 1, · · · , K − 1, to minimize a long-term expected cost in the following form with u k :
Each player P i tries to minimize the accumulated cost starting from any initial stage k 0 < K, yet can only change value of his own control u k i , k = k 0 , · · · , K − 1, i.e.,
which leads to the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) in Definition 1. At the equilibrium, every player has no incentive to change his action, if others' actions remain the same. Definition 1: In the N-person K-stage dynamic game with the state dynamics in (1), the type belief update in (2), and the cumulative cost in (3), a sequence of control poli-
D. Trajectory-tracking under Linear-quadratic Specification
In the following sections, we consider linear state dy-
is symmetric and positive semi-definite. The control objective is to track a time-varying trajectory {x k d i } k∈K with a quadratic cost penalty that minimizes the state tracking error and the control effort, i.e., g k
Note that each player aims to follow a different trajectory x k d i .
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS
We use dynamic programming with the composed state of belief statel k i and the physical state x k to compute the PBNE in a backward fashion with the boundary condi-
. For k = 0, 1, · · · , K − 1, we have the following recurrence form:
According to the inspection of the linear coupling of the belief state as well as the boundary condition quadratic with respect to the physical state, we make the ansatz
are a sequence of n-dimension vectors and scalars, respectively. Let k = K, we have the following boundary conditions.
Therefore, we rewrite the right hand side of (5) as the following quadratic form with respect to the state x k and control u k i , i.e.,
where 
Since the belief state is linear with respect to the parameter R l,k i , l ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, k ∈ K , we can define the following to incorporate the belief state, i.e.,
A. PBNE Control Policy
We obtain the PBNE policy in (9) with notations in (8) via a completion of the square.
The PBNE control value of P i , ∀i ∈ N , turns out to be Markov, i.e., depends on the state x k and type θ i . Define control vectors
and the following block matrices for each stage k ∈ K ,
The element matrix W 0,k i j shows implicitly how P j 's typerelated control policies affect P i 's policy under different type values θ i ∈ Θ i . In particular, W 0,k i l j h shows the effect of player i with type value θ l i on player j with type value θ h j . The matrix W 0,k has the following two structures.
First, the matrix W 0,k is a block-wise hollow matrix, i.e., W 0,k ii = 0, ∀i ∈ N , because the right hand side of (9) only includes the PBNE policy of other players, i.e., u * ,k −i . Second, the non-diagonal matrix blocks W 0,k i j
The belief matrix L k i j contains the P i 's belief of P j 's type θ j ∈ Θ j under his type θ i ∈ Θ i , and is a stochastic matrix in Definition 2.
Definition 2:
A matrix is a stochastic matrix if all its elements are positive and all the rows sum to one.
Similarly, we have the explicit form of elements of W 1,k and W 2,k as
Finally, we can rewrite (9) in the following matrix form.
Theorem 1: If matrix (W 1,k x k + W 2,k ) is in the column space of the matrix (I − W 0,k ), i.e., matrix (I − W 0,k ) is nonsingular, there exists a unique PBNE control policy for each player P i of any types θ l i , l = 1, 2, · · · , N i , which is an affine state-feedback control, i.e.,
Moreover, the cost parameters F k i j (θ i ), ∀i, j, θ i , k do not affect the PBNE policy u * ,k (x k ).
Remark 1: Theorem 1 shows that under the Markov belief assumption Pr(θ −i |h k , θ i ) = Pr(θ −i |x k , θ i ), the feedback control is also Markov, i.e., the control depends on the state x k rather than the history h k . Moreover, the PBNE policy is affine under the linear-quadratic setting. Finally, the cost parameters F k i j (θ i ), ∀i, j, θ i , k, affect only the equilibrium value yet not the equilibrium policy, which means that considering others' payoff and being altruistic do not improve the equilibrium of any players under any type values.
Proposition 1: The matrix (I − W 0,k ) is nonsingular if there exists an positive integer t (which could be infinity) such that (W 0,k ) t+1 = 0. Moreover, the inverse is S t := I + W 0,k + (W 0,k ) 2 + · · · + (W 0,k ) t .
Proof: Equivalently, we prove that if (I − W 0,k ) is singular, then (W 0,k ) t+1 = 0 for every positive integer t. First, if (I − W 0,k ) is singular, there exists a nonzero vector v such that W 0,k v = v, then (W 0,k ) t v = v, ∀t, which implies that (W 0,k ) t+1 = 0 for every positive integer t.
Proposition 1 shows necessary conditions for (I − W 0,k ) nonsingular. The matrix W 0,k is called a Nilpotent matrix if t is finite and a convergent matrix if t goes to infinity. Proposition 1 is not a sufficient condition because (W 0,k ) t v = v does not lead to W 0,k v = v for a nonzero vector v.
The following Proposition 2 shows the degeneration to a single player optimal control problem and Proposition 3 investigates the special case of two players N = 2, which the dimension of the inverse can be reduced by exploiting the zero elements in the two-by-two block matrix.
Proposition 2: If the matrix A in the state dynamics depends only on player i's type and all other N − 1 players lose control to the system, i.e., B j (θ j ) = 0, ∀ j ∈ {N \ i}, ∀θ j . Then, W 0,k = 0 and the control policy degenerates to the optimal state-feedback policy of a single person.
Proposition 3: For N = 2, define matrix Y := I − W 0,k 21 W 0,k 12 ∈ R m 2 N 2 ×m 2 N 2 . If Y is nonsingular, there exists a unique PBNE control under state x k , i.e.,
We use the following three facts. First, if the absolute values of all eigenvalues are less than one, the matrix is a convergent matrix. Then we can apply Proposition 1 to show the existence of the inverse. Second, the determinant of a matrix is equal to the product of its eigenvalues and the determinant of the matrix product is equal to the product of the determinants. Third, by Perron-Frobenius theorem, the largest eigenvalue of a stochastic matrix is 1. Also, the eigenvalues of a diagonal matrix are the diagonal elements. Thus, we require the absolute values of all eigenvalues of W 0,k 21 W 0,k 12 less than 1 as a necessary condition. Since stochastic matrices L k 12 and L k 21 's eigenvalue cannot be greater than 1, we only need the eigenvalue of the rest diagonal matrices less than 1.
Note that matrix Y is of a smaller dimension than (I − W 0,k ), thus simplifies the matrix inverse. Moreover, we can change the sequence of the control vector, i.e.,ũ k = [u k 2 , u k 1 ] and obtainỸ = I − W 0,k 12 W 0,k 21 ∈ R m 1 N 1 ×m 1 N 1 . Thus, we can choose either Y orỸ to obtain a lower dimension between m i N i , i ∈ {1, 2}.
B. Time Consistency
Let us denote H N (Γ; [0, K]; sol) as the N-person K-stage dynamic game with the product strategy space Γ, the initial stage k 0 = 0, and the solution concept sol, e.g., PBNE. 
The WTC property states that the policy is consistent on the equilibrium state trajectory. The STC property further guarantees that the policy is consistent for all potential equilibrium state trajectories, i.e., if players take actions that deviate from the optimal trajectory due to perturbations or trembling hands, the STC policy yields an equilibrium trajectory for the game that starts from the perturbed composed state.
Theorem 2: The PBNE policy (11) is strongly time consistent.
The proof follows directly from the definition of PBNE in Definition 1 and the fact that dynamic programming principle is used to obtain (5) with the composed state (l k i , x k ). In Definition (1), the sets of inequalities is true for all stage k 0 ∈ K as the initial stage, all possible state realizations h K , and belief statesl k i . If we revise the Definition 1 to be only true for k 0 = 0 and the equilibrium state history, then the resulted policy degenerates to be WTC.
C. Generalized Riccati Equation
We obtain the following set of generalized Riccati equations with boundary conditions in (6) via plugging the PBNE policy (11) into (5) and match the coefficient of the quadratic, linear, and constant terms, respectively. Let us denote matrix M k jl ∈ R m j ×∑j ∈N mj Nj , l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N j }, j ∈ N , k ∈ K as the (l + ∑ j−1 j=1 N¯j) th row block of the matrix (I − W 0,k ) −1 , which corresponds to the l th type of player j at stage k. Thenμ k j (x k , θ l j ) = M k jl W 1,k x k + M k jl W 2,k ∈ R m j followed from (11) . Define G k i :
, then for all l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N j }, j ∈ N , k ∈ K , the quadratic term leads to
The linear term leads to
The constant term leads to
Remark 2: If the realization of the type becomes public under a complete information game, thenl k i would be 1 for the real type and 0 for all other possible realizations, which degenerates (13), (14), (15) to the regular Riccati equations of N-person games.
Finally, we summarize the results in Theorem 3. Theorem 3: For an N-person K-stage linear-quadratic game specified in Section II-D, let there exist a set of matrix valued functions {S k i , N k i , q k i }, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K satisfying the generalized discrete-time Riccati equations (13), (14), (15) with boundary conditions in (6) . Then, for all non-singular matrix (I − W 0,k ), there exists a unique PBNE policy (11) as an affine state-feedback control law. The corresponding value function V k 0 i (l k i , x k 0 , θ i ) in (4) for each player i is
where u * ,k −i is the PBNE policies of all players except i. The bottleneck to compute the PBNE policy and the generalized Riccati equations is the coupling in type estimation and the control input, i.e., the separation principle does not hold. First, if the belief statel k i is known, each player can compute (13), (14), (15) from the terminal stage to the initial stage. However, the type learning in (2) depends on the PBNE policy in (11) and updates forwardly from the initial stage to the terminal stage. Thus, we need to find a consistent sequence of beliefs and control policies to satisfy the two boundary conditions of the last stage S K i as well as the initial beliefl 0 i . In Section IV, we iterate the forward and backward equations numerically until they converge to the consistent pair of the belief and the control, if the consistent pair exists. Once the belief of the type value converges to 0 or 1, the belief will remain the same according to the Bayesian update in (2) .
IV. CASE STUDY
In the case study, we consider a scalar system x k ∈ R whose state dynamics are affected by two distributed players P 1 , P 2 , who share a common control objective to track a signal but they are unaware of the other players' types. Each player can be either of a skilled or unskilled type, which is privately known to the player himself, and we use a binary random variableθ i to denote the type. In particular, θ 1 ∈
When both players are skilled, the system parameter A Hg := A(θ H 1 , θ g 2 ) = 0.1. If only one of them is skilled, then A Hg < A Lg = A Hb < 1. If none of them is skilled, the system becomes unstable A Lb = 1.1. The highly skilled player controls the system with more ease, and therefore we let B H
Suppose that both players aim to track the sinusoidal signal w k d := w k d i = 10 sin(0.05k), k ∈ K .
A. Belief Convergence
Consider the setting where two players have the same cost parameters, then the behaviors of two players become indistinguishable. First, all beliefs l k i (θ −i |x k , θ i ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, converge to the right type value as shown in Fig. 1 . After 30 steps, the belief of the unskilled player in blue converges, while the belief of the skilled player does not converge until 60 steps shown in two red lines. The blue lines converge faster because it is easier for an unskilled player to distinguish A Lg from A Lb which results in an unstable system. On the other hand, the highly skilled player has to distinguish between A Hg and A Hb which both result in a stable system.
The convergence rate of the belief depends on the distinguishability of different types. For example, in Fig. 2 , a highly skilled player can better learn the type of the other player if the value difference of A Hg and A Hb is larger. Similarly, the convergence rate increases under a closer initial guessl 0 i as shown in Fig. 3 , a more substantial value difference in B under two type values, or a smaller variance of the noise sequence w k .
B. PBNE Control Policy
We plot the control value and state in Fig. 4 the stable A as shown in Fig. 4 , or diverge quickly under the unstable A in Fig. 5 . It shows that the more capable player spends more control effort and a higher cost in the cooperation as shown in Fig. 4 . A higher cumulative cost V 0 1 (x 0 , θ H 1 ) = 911 > V 0 2 (x 0 , θ b 1 ) = 526 is observed for player 1. However, if both players are unskilled, then both of them have to spend more control efforts but achieve worse tracking results as shown in Fig. 5 . Their equilibrium controls also bear a much higher cumulative cost for each player, e.g.,
C. Asymmetric Information and Deception
Finally, we investigate the effect of the asymmetric information and compare it to the following two complete information structures. First, if both players' true type values are revealed at the initial stage, it degenerates to a classical linear quadratic game which shares the same results of PBNE and state tracking in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 after the belief converges. Second, if the first skilled player θ H 1 deceives the second unskilled player θ b 2 to believe that he is actually unskilled, i.e., l 0 2 (θ L 1 |x 0 , θ b 2 ) = 1, then the second unskilled player has to spend more efforts as shown in 6. However, the deception brings in a degeneration of the state tracking, thus increasing the cost of both players to 2753 and 2808, respectively. Therefore, although being skilled leads to more Fig. 3 . The belief l k 1 (θ b 2 |x k ,θ H 1 ),k ∈ K , converges under three different values of the initial belief l 0 1 (θ b 2 |x 0 ,θ H 1 ). An initial belief closer to the right type value increases the convergence rate. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work investigates the linear quadratic game under an asymmetric information structure where each player possesses private information known as the type. The solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) couples the forward belief dynamics and the backward dynamic programming equations of the players. We have provided a set of generalized Riccati equations for the N-person asymmetric information linear quadratic game and shown that the equilibrium policy takes an affine state-feedback form. The equilibrium control law is shown to be strongly time consistent and the separation principle does not hold for asymmetric information games. A case study has shown that the belief dynamics converge to the true type and the players can achieve the objective of tracking a sinusoidal reference signal under PBNE. , it is not beneficial for the skilled player to deceive the unskilled player to form a wrong belief.
